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TEXT OF STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1001 (1953 as amended) provides, in 
relevant part: 
41-la-1001. Definitions. 
(4) "Owner" means the person who has the legal right to 
possession of the vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (1953 as amended) provides: 
41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer—Penalty. 
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that he knows or has reason 
to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken to receive or 
transfer possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer from or to another; or 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer that he knows or has reason to 
believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is not a 
peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of his 
duty. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504 (1953 as amended provides, in relevant 
part: 
70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral 
after default — Effect of disposition. 
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or 
otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its 
then condition or following any commercially reasonable 
preparation or processing. 
. . . . 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or 
private proceedings and may be made by way of one or more 
contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in 
parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every 
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, 
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. 
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline 
speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and 
place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the 
time after which any private sale or other intended 
disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party 
to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a 
statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification 
of sale. . . . [Notification shall be sent to any other 
secured party from whom the secured party has received 
(before sending his notification to the debtor or before the 
iii 
debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a 
claim of interest in the collateral. . . . 
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party 
after default, the disposition transfers to a purchaser for 
value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the 
security interest under which it is made and any security 
interest or lien subordinate thereto. . . . 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v« 
DERALD ROSS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940528-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994) and Rule 26(2) (a) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. In this case, a jury in 
the court of the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction against Mr. Ross for 
"Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle," a second 
degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court err in convicting Mr. Ross of 
Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle under Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-la-112? 
(a) Was there sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of 
Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle? 
(b) Was the trial court in error to deny Mr. Ross's motion 
for a directed verdict for Mr. Ross at the close of the State's 
case? 
(c) Was Appellant properly convicted of Receiving or 
Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle even though the title to said 
vehicle was in his name from the time Mr. Ross purchased said 
vehicle to the time of his criminal information? 
(d) Was the trial court in error to deny Mr. Ross's Motion 
to Dismiss the State's case? 
^ STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1953 as 
amended). A jury found Mr. Ross guilty after two-day trial held 
on August 2nd and 3rd, 1994, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
Judge, presiding. 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Ross to a term of 2 years at 
the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On November 16, 1990, Mr. Ross purchased a 1977 Dodge 
Charger ("Charger"), VIN # XS22G7R267849, for $60.00. 
(Transcript of August 2 and August 3, 1994, hereinafter "T", at 
1:145.) 
2. On February 21, 1991, Mr. Ross and his wife, Rebecca 
Ross registered the Charger with the Motor Vehicle Division. The 
Motor Vehicle Division issued a Utah Certificate of Title for the 
Charger to Rebecca and/or Derald Ross. (T, at 1:44-47.) 
3. On October 30, 1992, Mr. Ross obtained a loan from Quick 
Loan and pledged the Charger as security. (T, at 1:61-63, 1:149-
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150.) 
4. The loan agreement between Mr. Ross and Quick Loan 
states, in relevant part: 
Lender will give you at least ten days notice of any public 
sale or the date after which Lender will agree to have a 
private sale. 
(T, at 1:82, 1:150.) 
5. On or about November of 1992, Mr. Ross took the Charger 
to the home of Glen Burns in Stockton, Utah, and left the Charger 
there. (T, at 1:111-112.) During that time, Mr. Ross defaulted 
on the loan from Quick Loan. 
6. On either April 12 or April 13, 1993, American Recovery 
Services took possession of the Charger from Mr. Burns1 home in 
Stockton, Utah. (T, at 1:73.) 
7. On either April 12 or April 13, 1993, Quick Loan 
attempted to notify Mr. Ross by mail that Quick Loan had 
repossessed the Charger. (T, at 1:74.) 
8. On April 22 or April 23, 1993, American Recovery 
Services transferred possession of the Charger to Quick Loan. 
(T, at 1:73-74, 1:83, 1:86.) 
9. On May 4, 1993, Quick Loan sold the Charger to J&K Auto. 
(T, at 1:75.) J&K took possession of the Charger. The Charger 
was then parked on Main Street, with nothing to indicate that J&K 
Auto owned the Charger. (T, at 1:92.) 
10. On or about May 10, 1993, while Mr. Ross was driving to 
his father's home along Main Street in Salt Lake City. Mr. Ross 
saw the Charger parked on the curb with his license plates on the 
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Charger, Mr. Ross took possession of the Charger. (T, 1:152-
154.) 
11. On or about May 18, 1993, Mr. Ross and Guy Gritton took 
the Charger to Quality Emissions. Between August and September 
of 1993f the Charger was towed to Ron Ison's mechanic's shop. 
(T, at 1:98-101, 1:119.) 
12. On or about November 30, 1993, Mr. Ross received a 
letter from the State of Utah stating, in relevant part: 
The above-described vehicle [the Charger] was impounded on 
November 29, 1993, by the Motor Vehicle Division. 
Information available indicates you have an interest in this 
vehicle. 
(T, at 1:159). 
13. On January 18, 1994, the State of Utah filed an 
information against Mr. Ross for Receiving or Transferring a 
Stolen Motor Vehicle in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 
41-la-1316(2). 
14. On February 2, 1994, the Charger was sold at an impound 
auction. Prior to that date, the Motor Vehicle Division listed 
the owner of the Charger as Rebecca Ross and/or Derald Ross. (T, 
at 1:49.) 
15. On August 3, 1994, a jury found Mr. Ross guilty of 
Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, a second degree 
felony. (T, at 11:69.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Ross 
was guilty of the crime of Receiving or Transferring a Stolen 
Motor Vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316, when read in 
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conjunction with relevant case and statutory law, seems to 
require that possession of the property of another is a requisite 
element of the crime. 
The facts in this case fail to establish that Mr. Ross was 
not the owner of the vehicle that the State alleged was stolen at 
the time Mr. Ross possessed it. Concomitantly, the evidence 
establishing that Mr. Ross knew or believed that the vehicle was 
stolen at the time he possessed it was so insubstantial that 
reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as 
to his guilt. Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
conviction of Mr. Ross and remand this matter to the trial court 
for acquittal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF 
RECEIVING OR TRANSFERRING A STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. S 41-la-1316. 
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A JURY TO CONVICT 
MR. ROSS OF RECEIVING OR TRANSFERRING A STOLEN VEHICLE. 
Due process requires that the state prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense charged. 
State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1988), citing Patterson 
v. New York. 432 U.S. 197, 211, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d 
287 (1977). Where a defendant claims on appeal that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish one or more elements of the 
crime for which he was convicted, the standard of review differs 
depending on whether the case was tried to the bench or to a 
jury. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-3 (Utah 1987). 
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When an appellate court in this state reviews the sufficiency of 
evidence in a case tried to a jury, this Court "will reverse a 
conviction if the evidence is so insubstantial or inconclusive 
that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a reasonable 
doubt as to a defendant's guilt." State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 
222 (Utah 1986).* 
In the present case, a jury convicted Mr. Ross of Receiving 
or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle under Utah Code Ann. § 41-
la-1316(2) (1953 as amended). Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 
provides: 
41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer—Penalty-
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that he knows or has reason 
to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken to receive or 
transfer possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer from or to another; or 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer that he knows or has reason to 
believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is not a 
peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of his 
duty. 
As the title of the statute indicates, this statute focuses 
on the transfer and receipt of stolen vehicles, trailers, or 
semitrailers. Implicit in the language of the second part of the 
statute are the basic elements of the crime: (1) property 
1
 When a case is tried to the bench, the court will set 
aside the findings or verdict where they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or if the court otherwise "reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made . . . ." 
Id. at 193. 
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belonging to another has been stolen;2 (2) the defendant was in 
possession of the stolen property; (3) at the time of possessing 
the property the defendant knew or believed the property was 
stolen; and (4) the defendant acted purposely to deprive the 
owner of the possession of the property. See State v. Murphy. 
617 P.2d 399 (Utah 1980); accord State v. Lamm. 606 P.2d 229 
(Utah 1980)• 
In State v. Hill, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
burglary and second degree theft conviction of two defendants. 
In Hill, the defendants visited an antique store and left without 
making a purchase. The antique store owner noticed the next 
morning that some items were missing. Meanwhile, the 
defendants—one of whom owned his own antique store—were 
traveling back to their home in Oregon. Hill. 727 P.2d at 222. 
At the request of Utah police officers, an Oregon police 
officer investigated and found a rocking chair from the Utah 
antique store in one of the defendant's van, as well as three 
captain's chairs also from the Utah antique store in the 
defendants' homes. One of the defendants produced a receipt to 
explain his possession of the chairs. Id. Testimony of other 
witnesses explained that a third party had taken the chairs and 
sold them to one of the defendants. The testimony demonstrated 
that the defendant "had purchased the chairs in good faith, 
obtaining what he thought to be a valid bill of sale, and that 
The state did not list this element in its instructions 
to the jury. See T. at 11:36, 11:46-47. 
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they lacked any knowledge or belief that the chairs in their 
possession were stolen." Id. at 223. 
The Hill court defined the elements of theft by receiving— 
for which the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt—as 
follows: 
(1) the defendant received, retained, or disposed of the 
property of another, (2) knowing that the property had been 
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, (3) 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
Id. (emphasis added). Despite testimony from the Utah antique 
store owner that one of the defendants saw one the rocking chairs 
in her store, the Hill court ruled that "the evidence, taken as a 
whole, was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendants knew or had reason to believe the chairs were in fact 
stolen." Xd. Accordingly, the Hill court reversed the 
defendantsf conviction. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed a trial 
court's dismissal of an information of theft against a defendant 
brought under Idaho Code section 18-2403(4).3 State v. Barnes, 
859 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Idaho 1989). In Barnes, the defendant was 
charged in 1991 with grand theft by possession of stolen property 
3
 Idaho Code section 18-2403(4) provides, in relevant part, 
that "[a] person commits theft when he knowingly receives, retains, 
conceals, obtains control over, possesses, or disposes of stolen 
property, knowing the property to have been stolen by another or 
under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him to believe 
that the property was stolen, and 
(a) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or 
benefit of the property. . . . " 
Idaho Code § 18-2403(4). 
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based on the allegation that he possessed a new model Chevrolet 
pick-up that was taken from a car dealership in 1983. 
The defendant moved to dismiss the information on two 
grounds; the latter being that there was insufficient evidence to 
bind him over for trial. Id. at 1387. The trial court "noted 
that one of the essential elements of the crime of theft is that 
some person other than the defendant be the owner of the alleged 
stolen item.11 Id. at 1387. In granting the defendant's motion, 
the trial court concluded that because the car dealership had 
"lost its right to possession by failing to initiate a cause of 
action against [the defendant] within the [] three year statute 
of limitations," the State of Idaho could not show that "there 
was an 'owner1 of the truck." Id. at 1387-88. The Barnes court, 
citing section 18-2402(6) of the Idaho Code, which defines 
"owner," affirmed the trial court's dismissal. Id. at 1387, 
1389. 
Section 18-2402(6) of the Idaho Code defines the term 
"owner" to mean "any person who has the right to possession [of 
the piece of property] superior to that of the taker, obtainer or 
withholder." Idaho Code § 18-2402(6). In Utah, the very chapter 
under which the State charged Mr. Ross, section 41-la-1001 of the 
Utah Code Annotated defines the "owner" of a vehicle as "the 
person who has the legal right to possession of the vehicle." 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1001 (1953 as amended). 
In the instant case, as late as November 30, 1993, the State 
of Utah told Mr. Ross that he had an "interest" in the Charger. 
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(T, at 1:159.) Furthermore, state records listed Mr. Ross as the 
owner of the Charger as late as February 2, 1994. (T, at 1:49.) 
Therefore, sufficient evidence exists to establish that Mr. Ross 
was the rightful owner of the Charger; negating the first element 
of the crime of receiving stolen property. Furthermore, the 
existence of documents showing Mr. Ross to be the owner of the 
Charger raise substantial doubt that at the time of possessing 
the Charger, Mr. Ross knew or believed the Charger was stolen; 
negating the third element of the crime of stolen property. Such 
documents also bring into serious question whether Mr. Ross acted 
purposely to deprive the "owner" of the possession of the 
Charger; negating the fourth element of the crime of receiving 
stolen property. See Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (discussing elements 
of receiving stolen property); accord Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (same). 
In addition, the same problem that was fatal to the 
prosecution1s case in Barnes is present in the instant case. In 
Barnes, the car dealership lost its right to possession by 
failing to initiate a cause of action within the three year 
statute of limitations. Barnes, 859 P.2d at 1388. Under the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Quick Loan was obligated to give 
Mr. Ross reasonable notification "of the time after which any 
private sale or other intended disposition is to be made." Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1953 as amended). Christopher O'Dell, 
a witness for the State, testified that a "ten-day letter" was 
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mailed to Mr. Ross on April 13, 1993.4 (T, at 1:74, 1:82.) 
Regardless of Mr. Ross's claim that he never received Quick 
Loan's letter, (T, at 1:150-151.), evidence produced at trial 
show that the Charger was sold to J&K Auto on April 22 or April 
23, 1993. (T, at 1:73-74, 1:78-79, 1:80-81, 1:83, 1:86. 
Arguably, if the Charger was sold on April 23, 1993, by 
Quick Loan to J&K Auto, Mr. Ross may have been properly deprived 
of his ownership interest in the Charger under section 70A-9-
504(3) of the Utah Code Annotated. If Quick Loan had sold the 
Charger on April 22, 1993, then Quick Loan did not comply with 
its loan agreement with Mr. Ross,5 and therefore, did not 
properly deprive Mr. Ross of his ownership interest in the 
Charger through the sale to J&K Auto. 
Taken together—(1) that the title to the Charger was in the 
name of Mr. Ross and his spouse until at February 2, 1994, (2) 
that the State of Utah notified Mr. Ross that he had an interest 
in the Charger by a letter dated November 30, 1993, and (3) that 
Quick Loan may not have properly deprived Mr. Ross of his 
ownership interest in the Charger by failing to comply with the 
4
 Incidentally, at trial the State failed to produce such 
a notification letter, or a copy thereof. (T, at 1:74, 1:82, 
1:87.) 
5
 The loan agreement between Mr. Ross and Quick Loan 
states, in relevant part: 
Lender will give you at least ten days notice of any public 
sale or the date after which Lender will agree to have a 
private sale. 
(T, at 1:82, 1:150.) 
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reasonable notice requirement of section 70A-9-504(3) of the Utah 
Code Annotated—reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Ross: (a) received the property of 
another, or (b) knew or believed the property to be stolen at the 
time he possessed it. 
In Hill, the Supreme Court of Utah held that "the existence 
of a reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." Hill, 727 P.2d at 
222. The facts of this case necessarily raise reasonable doubt 
of Mr. Ross's guilt because a reasonable hypothesis of innocence 
exists, namely that Mr. Ross was the owner of the Charger 
throughout the relevant course of these proceedings, and thus, 
could not be convicted of stealing his own vehicle. 
Alternatively, a second hypothesis of innocence exists: given 
that all of the indicia of ownership of the Charger pointed to 
Mr. Ross—(1) the Charger's title was in the name of Mr. Ross and 
his spouse, (2) Mr. Ross's license plates were on the Charger 
when he spotted it on Main Street (T, at 1:152-154.), (3) the 
State of Utah informed Mr. Ross by a letter dated November 30, 
1993, that he had an interest in the Charger—a reasonable doubt 
is necessarily raised as to whether Mr. Ross knew or believed 
that the Charger was stolen while it was in his possession. In 
either case, because the State failed to prove a necessary 
element of the crime of receiving or transferring a stolen motor 
vehicle, this Court should reverse Mr. Ross's conviction. 
In denying Mr. Ross's motion to dismiss at the close of the 
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state's evidence, the trial court judge said 
The fact that the title on this vehicle was not changed 
throughout the course of these events, in my judgment, is 
not determinative of the issues before this Court. This 
Defendant is charged with the crime of having received a 
stolen motor vehicle. Specifically, the pertinent elements 
of that crime, it seems to me, are that he had in his 
possession on a given date a motor vehicle which he either 
knew or should have known was stolen or unlawfully taken. 
T. at 1:140. 
Regardless of whether the trial court judge believed that 
sufficient evidence had been presented to defeat Mr. Ross's 
motion to dismiss, a review of the evidence in this case 
establishes that because integral elements of the crime are 
absent—such as possession of a stolen vehicle, or knowledge or 
belief that the vehicle was stolen—the jury's verdict is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have 
reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, this 
Court should reverse the conviction of Mr. Ross. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MR. ROSS'S MOTION FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT IN HIS FAVOR AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
STATE'S EVIDENCE. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the facts of this case 
fail to establish that Mr. Ross had possession of a stolen 
vehicle. The decision of the trial judge to deny Mr. Ross's 
motion for a directed verdict was clearly erroneous and should be 
reversed by this Court. 
C. BECAUSE THE OWNER OF A VEHICLE CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF 
POSSESSING THAT VEHICLE WITH KNOWLEDGE OR REASON TO 
BELIEVE THAT THE VEHICLE WAS STOLEN, MR. ROSS'S 
CONVICTION WAS IMPROPER. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, Mr. Ross was the owner of 
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the Charger on the date of the criminal information, and thus, 
was improperly convicted of Receiving or Transferring a Stolen 
Vehicle. Hence, his convicted should be reversed. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. ROSS'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS THE STATE'S CASE. 
On June 8, 1994, Mr. Ross filed a motion and memorandum to 
dismiss the State's case against him. See Addendum "A". 
Implicitly, the trial court judge denied Mr. Ross's motion to 
dismiss. Based on the foregoing discussion, the trial court's 
denial of Mr. Ross's motion to dismiss was erroneous. 
Concomitantly, this Court should reverse Mr. Ross's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, premises considered, Mr. Ross respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-la-1316 and remand this matter to the trial court for 
acquittal or render such other relief as justice requires. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ISi^ day of June, 1995. 
t^L 
iYS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
C^R^BERT LATHAM 
^t£drney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, J. ROBERT LATHAM, HEREBY CERTIFY that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, 
and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of June, 
1995. 
J3< ROBERT LATHAM 
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ADDENDUM 
Lowell V. Summerhays r.3.154 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
6400 Commerce Park . ,.,.,'„ 
448 East 6400 South, #314 " 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-4495 
Attorney for Defendant 
©Opy 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIl 1. DISTRICT CDTTPT 111 II " ND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
I ' l d l l l i i l l , 
vs. 
DERALD ROSS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No- 941900525FS 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The defendant Derald Rossf by through his counsel of 
2 Adamsc I" Summerhays, 
submits the following memorandum support of the defendant's 
motion to dismiss. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The f allowing facts are summarized from Uww statement 
presented to defendant's counsel by the prosecution. 
The defendant Derold Ross obtained a loan from Quick Loan 
on wtoiDex I  i i mi in mi II | j l * j f l i j e i l i i u r i e c m i ill , iii I  i "' ' D o d g e C h a r g e r , 
VINXS22G7R267849. 
2. ' r endant de fau l ted on t he c o n t r a c t l oan . 
3. Derold Ross received notice that the Dodge Charger was to 
be repossessed by American Recovery Service on behalf of Quick Loan 
on April 15, 1993. 
4. The vehicle was found by Derold Ross parked on a street 
with his license plates attached to the vehicle. 
5. On April 22, 1993, the subject vehicle was sold by Quick 
Loan to J&K Auto without prior notice or consent from Derold Ross. 
ARGUMENT 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the vehicle sale had 
been completed within seven days after the repossession occurred. 
The defendant did not receive prior notice whatsoever, that 
his vehicle would be sold. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504, 
the secured party, after default may sell all of the collateral of 
the debtor in a reasonably commercial manner upon reasonable notice 
to the debtor. 
(3) [U]nless collateral is perishable or threatens 
to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily 
sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of 
the time and place of any public sale or reasonable 
notification of the time after which any private sale or 
other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by 
the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed 
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his 
right to notification of sale, (emphasis added). 
The defendant did not receive any notice that his vehicle was 
being sold. In order to deprive the defendant of title to his 
vehicle, Quick Loan should have complied with the current 
commercial policy of notifying the defendnat of the proposed sale. 
To be convicted of theft of the automobile at issue, the 
2 
defendant would have had to obtain or exercise unaullicA J.UUI.1 .'.ml " •! 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive another 
thereof. 
A person is not guilty of theft of receiving stolen items if 
tiipy -
(a) Acted 'under an hone& 
{fa,! Acted in the honest bel sc*» th^t c* -;*- - .M*. t o 
« . in i-,|\,ei,c i si1 I i ' ironer" j . Utah Code Ann,
 3 76-
6 - 4 0 2 ( 3 ) . 
f mimi guilty receiving transferring 
stolen motor :• 
that knows reas, believe has oeeii stolen 
taken. Utah Code Ann 
Derold Ross clears
 7 i *.^ .. _ 
with plates attached i : i : oo; v t .„ *%.- own possession. 
orocedures pursuant 
to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore, Deroici Ross 
notice of the impending sale and never lost legal title 
^ _*.*. venicie. 
CONCLUSION 
D e r o l i l III!'''! '•!-!'» "i'' n l (J o i l II bo deprived cr legal ownership • :he 
vehicle if the lender, Quit l\ I„.o JIIIIII,, t o w h o m i1 1'eliicie was - .-< 
s t r i c t l y followed the procedure of sale, Derold Ross reassuming 
possess. I II i i ' C M ' i vehicle 
3 
and this case should respectfully be dismissed« 
DATED this 6th day of June, 1994. 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS, postage pre-paid this day of June, 1994, to the 
following: 
C. Dane Nolan 
2001 South State Street S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841190-1200 
(801) 468-3422 
/ / 
/, 
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